Recent Cases Cause Uncertainly Regarding Residential Restrictions and the N.C. Real Property Marketable Title Act

You may have heard about the recent pair of cases decided by the North Carolina Court of Appeals involving the North Carolina Real Property Marketable Title Act, which is codified at NCGS Chapter 47B.  The two decisions are C Investments 2, LLC v. Auger et al., and C.E. Williams III et al. v. Reardon et al. These decisions will have a significan adverse impact to North Carolina HOAs and condominiums if allowed to stand - but we don't believe that they will be allowed to stand.

The Marketable Title Act was passed almost 50 years ago and was designed to extinguish certain title flaws or encumbrances, if they had not appeared in any recorded documents within a given chain of title within the past 30 years.  The point was to clarify title and remove minor, old or forgotten matters of title if they had not reoccurred, been rerecorded, or been litigated within the past 30 years of when the title was being examined.  The Marketable Title Act has a number of exceptions for things which are not extinguished even though they may be more than 30 years old, including an exception for "covenants applicable to a general or uniform scheme of development which restrict the property to residential use only, provided said covenants are otherwise enforceable."  This exception had always been interpreted by real property and homeowners association lawyers to mean that restrictive covenants for residential subdivisions were excepted from the Marketable Title Act and therefore remain in place in perpetuity, as most covenants specifically provide, even if they are older than 30 years and even if they don't appear in a given chain of title within the past 30 years.

The Court of Appeals unfortunately ruled contrary to the longstanding common opinion and practice, interpreting the above-quoted provision to mean that residential restrictive covenants which have not appeared in a given chain of title within the past 30 years are completely extinguished, other than any provision specifically restricting the property to residential use only.  While the Court of Appeals took the position that this was a plain reading of the plain words of the statute, that reading if allowed to stand would upend every subdivision with restrictive covenants 30 years or more old and cause chaos in the chains of title of thousands of homes and residential subdivisions statewide.

For example, imagine an older subdivision with residential restrictive covenants of the typical sort, which were originally recorded more than 30 years ago.  Mr. and Ms. Jones reside on Lot 1 and have lived in their home for 31 years.  Mr. and Ms. Smith live on Lot 2 and just bought their home last year.  Based on these Court of Appeals rulings, the covenants are now extinguished on Mr. and Ms. Jones' property, other than the restriction that it can only be used for single family residential purposes.  So they can quit paying dues, maintain old junked cars on cinderblocks in their front yard, and allow their home to fall into complete disrepair.  On the other hand, what is the situation next door at the Smiths?  It depends on what the deed they received said, and what the deeds of all the other folks in the chain of title for their lot in the past 30 years said.  If the recorded restrictive covenants were mentioned in any of those deeds, then by the Court of Appeal's reasoning, they have been revived and the Smiths must comply with every provision of those restrictions.  If none of the deeds mentioned the restrictions, then they get to be scofflaws just like their neighbors the Joneses.  What if their deed said something vague like, "This deed is subject to all documents of record"?  Who knows?  The Court of Appeals doesn't tell us.  Thus, chaos.

It is a universal opinion among real property and homeowners association attorneys in the state that these decisions were wrong.  The General Assembly is currently reviewing legislation to make corrections to the Marketable Title Act that will put things back the way they have always been.  The chaos which will result if that does not happen it is a strong assurance that it will. 

Bottom line: We do not believe that this is a situation which should be of concern for North Carolina HOAs or condominiums at this time. We believe the General Assembly will remedy the matter. Of course we will be monitoring the situation and will provide further updates as they occur.

Contact us if we can provide any further information, and thank you for following the NC HOA Law Blog.

Stay Out of My Tiki Hut! Court of Appeals Explores Extent of Access Easements in Recent Case

The Fiorentino home as seen from the street,
with the beach access boardwalk.

The North Carolina Court of Appeals issued an entertaining decision in Sea Watch at Kure Beach Homeowners' Association v. Fiorentino in November 2019.  In this case, a developer of a seaside residential community had reserved an access easement across a homeowner's lot, Lot 6, for other residents to access the beach.  Eventually, the access area was expanded to include not only a wooden boardwalk, but also a deck area, bathrooms, and a tiki bar.  After these improvements had been in place and in use for approximately 10 years, a homeowner who bought Lot 6 demanded that the improvements be removed and the easement area returned to its original documented use as set forth in the easement agreement for access to the beach only.  The homeowners association eventually filed suit and requested a declaratory judgment, which is a request for the court to declare the respective rights and obligations of the various parties.

The Fiorentino home in question is at top in this picture with what admittedly looks like a pretty large tiki hut on the walkway between the two homes shown.

             After a Superior Court trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the HOA and dismissed the counterclaims of the owner of Lot 6. The court stated that the improvements were allowed to remain, and the association was allowed to continue to use of the deck, bathrooms and tiki bar even though the written easement agreement only provided for an access easement.

            The trial court analyzed the history of the use of this area and made the legal determination that an "access easement" "is not merely one of ingress and egress; public representations made by the developer expanded the easement to one involving use of the improvements" as well.  The court seemed to also feel that it was important that the improvements had been in use for a substantial period of time and in fact, it appeared that the owners of  Lot 6 had had the use of them along with all of the other homeowners in the community for about 5 years, which was the amount of time that the owners of Lot 6 had lived in the neighborhood prior to purchasing Lot 6.

            This case is important for a couple of reasons.  First of all, it underlines the need for easements and other similar documents to be very specific as to the use which is intended by the original parties.  In this case, the court refused to interpret the phrase "access easement” strictly and ruled that an access easement could include the use of these types of pretty significant improvements since the easement document itself provided no specific limitations on what was meant by "access".  Homeowners associations, developers, and others entering into easements or placing restrictions on land should be explicit in describing what their intentions are in entering into the agreement as well as very specifically describing the various rights and duties granted in the document itself.

            In addition, the court found it important that the tiki bar and other improvements had been in existence for approximately 10 years  and were apparently well known to the Lot 6 owners even before they purchased Lot 6.  This brings up a couple of other important points.  The doctrine of estoppel is very important in understanding contract law and homeowners association law.  This is the doctrine of the enforcement of reasonable expectations between contracting parties.  In this case, the Lot 6 owners had purchased Lot 6 well knowing of the existence of these substantial improvements and therefore, the court found that they were estopped from later complaining about them. Estoppel is a key legal concept which prevents a party from reneging upon an expectation it reasonably induces in another party to the bargain.

            This decision also highlights that real property purchases are almost always a "buyer beware" transaction.  Notwithstanding the fact that sellers in North Carolina are required to fill out lengthy disclosures in residential real estate transactions, the law of the state of North Carolina with regard to the purchase of residential property is generally very buyer adverse. In other words, it is very difficult to sue a seller, or in this case a third party developer, for any condition on a piece of land which the buyer was aware of, or should have been aware of, or could have discovered using reasonable due diligence. Generally, even if the seller completely lies in a real property disclosure, that lie will not be actionable unless there is no way the buyer could have detected the true state of the property using reasonable due diligence prior to closing.  This decision further exemplifies the rule that a buyer generally buys property subject to any and all conditions that they could have reasonably discovered prior to closing.

            Please reach out to us if we can assist your homeowners association with any legal matters, or if you are a developer who prefers to stay out of court!

Virus Check: What do Businesses Need to Know About COVID-19 Liability?

Virus Check: What is Your Liability as a Business?

The current situation we are facing is unprecedented from a legal standpoint. The ability to enforce contracts, loans, leases and all manner of legal relationships is now in question based on financial hardships as well as our court system working at greatly diminished capacity. Reasonableness, negotiation and working cooperatively are now more important than ever before.

Businesses of all types are concerned about being sued. What do you need to know?

Negligence is your first concern.Can a business be sued if an employee or customer were to contract a communicable disease at the employer’s workplace, or from a co-worker or customer? It depends on whether the business took reasonable actions to protect its employees and customers in light of the information available to it – in other words, whether the business was negligent.

Tort law, or the law of negligence, applies in this situation. It holds that a person can be liable to another person to whom the first person owes a duty if the first person commits an act which is unreasonable (or fails to take a reasonably necessary action) which could reasonably be anticipated to cause damage to the second person, and the second person did not help cause the wrongful act or omission.

For example, the Governor of North Carolina had previously prohibited all “mass gatherings” of 50 or more people (since reduced to 10); therefore, it was legal at that time (at least in most counties) to have mass gatherings of less than 50. But would this be reasonable in light of the CDC’s warnings against gatherings of more than 10 people? It depends on the situation, but a strong argument could be made that such would not be reasonable - in other words, we could not assure you that you would not get sued if someone got sick from such a gathering.

You owe a duty of reasonable care to your members, customers and employees; failure to take reasonable care to protect these parties from infection could result in liability. Reasonableness is the touchstone, based upon all the facts and circumstances involved. Failure to abide by local orders or regulations when they are directly intended to preserve public safety, as well as customary standards of care, have been held to constitute actionable negligence in other contexts. Cruise ship operators are already facing numerous lawsuits from those sickened while onboard based on this legal theory. Please contact us if we can help you work through liability issues of concern.

Workplace safety is also obviously very much in play today. In addition to the above negligence standards, workplaces of all types must abide by federal and state occupational health and safety requirements, typically as determined by OSHA. Employers must take efforts to maintain a hazard-free workplace, while still safeguarding the privacy rights of any affected employee.

OSHA requires that employers provide a safe workplace for all employees which is "free from recognized hazards … likely to cause death or serious bodily harm."

OSHA has not adopted specific regulations regarding COVID-19 in the general workplace at this time, but has instead recommended that employers follow CDC guidelines regarding personal safety, as well as any state or local guidelines or requirements - North Carolina's being found here.

The North Carolina Department of Labor, like OSHA, has not adopted specific regulations, but has emphasized the need to follow social distancing guidelines, maintain a clean workplace, and work from home where possible, and has emphasized the importance of proper personal protective equipment. Both the

NC Department of Labor and OSHA have especially emphasized worker safety with regard to respiration - in other words, being sure workers working with the public wear face masks, or more intensive respirators for those in healthcare, janitorial staff working with hazardous cleaning materials, and the like.

OSHA’s "free from recognized hazards" standard places much discretion in the hands of federal and state regulators if they feel an employer has not taken all reasonable steps to provide a hazard-free workplace for its employees. To be safe, employers should also implement procedures designed to promptly identify and isolate potentially infectious workers, per OSHA guidance. Illness or potential illness by employee must be kept confidential to the extent possible per federal ADA requirements; contact us if you run into this issue.

Contract law and force majeure clauses. Many contracts contain a force majeure clause, which translates from French as “superior force.”  It refers to uncontrollable events that are not the fault of any party and which interfere with a party’s ability to complete its end of the bargain or receive what it bargained for in the deal. Common examples are hurricanes, riots, labor stoppages and war. At first blush, it would appear that a pandemic would constitute a force majeure, but the terms of the contract control. You must review the specific language of the contract in question. Language such as “circumstances outside our control” is very broad and will cover the current situation and allow the party benefited by the provision to avoid the contract.  More specific language such as the common “acts of God, war, insurrection, civil strife, riots or labor disturbances” may not be as helpful depending since the list arguably excludes pandemics. If you are facing language which may not cover the current situation, you may have to negotiate and reach an agreement with your opposing party. If you do so, please, please document the agreement. Obviously, we can help. But even an exchange of emails can be sufficient to amend a contract if both parties agree.

Common law force majeure, or the doctrine of impossibility, may also apply if it is impossible or illegal for the parties to carry out the purpose and intent of the contract. Send your contract to us for review if you have issues or concerns. If upon reviewing your contracts, you find provisions which do not suit your needs in the current climate, do not forget that you may amend the current contract or at least change it going forward.  We can quickly supply you with alternative language and have already done so for some of our business clients.

How to Handle HOA/Condo Board Member Resignations

By Chris Gelwicks, Esq.

From time to time we receive questions regarding the resignation of directors, term expiration and what to do in the event of a mass resignation by the existing board.  The North Carolina Planning Community Act, Condominium Act, and the Non-Profit Corporation Act address certain issues with regard to directors’ terms and how to fill vacancies.  Generally, the remaining board members appoint a replacement to serve out a resigning director’s term. But what happens when directors resign and do not appoint their successors, or when there are not enough remaining directors left to appoint replacements? 

Section 55A-08-05(d) of the North Carolina Non-Profit Corporations Act provides that when the term of a director expires, that director continues to serve until his or her successor is appointed or elected and takes office.  This seems to be in contrast with Section 55A-08-07 which indicates that a director’s resignation is effective upon communication of that resignation to the board (unless the resignation sets forth another effective date).  The key difference between the two statutes are the terms “expire” and “resign”.  Normally, in either case, the remaining directors would appoint someone to fill the empty seat unless the bylaws indicate differently. The board could also choose to hold an election for the empty seat(s).

Where we run into problems is where an entire board resigns at once and no successors are appointed.  Pursuant to Section 55A-08-30, directors on boards have a duty to act in good faith, with reasonable care, and in a manner that is in the best interest of the association.  Such fiduciary duties include that directors enforce the declaration of covenants, collect assessments, and ensure that the association is run and continues to be run effectively.  It is a reasonable conclusion that if an entire board resigns at once and appoints no successors to fill vacancies, then the association cannot be effectively run.  Those directors who resigned en masse potentially subject themselves to liability by not finding and appointing replacements; those directors, by basically abandoning their posts, could be construed to have violated their fiduciary duties.

The same could also apply if so many directors resign that the board can no longer reach a quorum to make a decision on appointing replacement directors.  Keep in mind that the bylaws of your homeowners association ultimately control and can provide a different procedure than these North Carolina state statutes.  If you are reading this and are on the board of your association, you may wish to review your bylaws to determine what they say in these situations and whether changes might be necessary to provide better procedures, such as stating that even board members who resign also continue to serve until their successors take office.

The bottom line is this: Resignations, vacancies and the like are not to be taken lightly.  Directors who resign should always find a successor if at all possible and submit those names to the remaining board members.  If an entire board intends to resign – which is an extremely bad idea to begin with and should be avoided at all costs – they should do so in a manner that allows successors to be appointed and the association to continue to function.  For example, the resignations may be staged over time to allow replacements to come aboard.  And remember that, at least in North Carolina, board members whose terms expire continue to serve, and continue to have fiduciary duties to the association and the members, until their replacements take office.

Failure to appoint successors in a way that results in a dysfunctional board can result in personal liability to the resigning directors for breach of fiduciary duty.  As always, don’t hesitate to contact us to discuss strategies, procedures and potential liabilities when dealing with board matters.

Click here for another of our blog posts regarding board of directors matters.

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No Class Certification in Case Alleging Condominium Association and Management Company Charged Excessive Fees

The North Carolina Court of Appeals recently decided a case involving several homeowners’ claims that their condominium association, through its management company, was charging excessively high fees and late charges that were not permitted by the condominium’s governing documents.  We want to point out that these were simply allegations - the only part of this case that matters from a legal perspective is that the homeowners asked for class-action status, which was denied. 

                              

For discussion purposes, there is not much distinction between the laws that govern condominiums and homeowners associations. All condominiums and HOAs are governed by declarations that specify the particular restrictions for the condominium or subdivision.  The rule of law is that the declaration (in conjunction with the bylaws, the association’s policies and rules and regulations), specifies the fines and late fees that can be assessed against homeowners for delinquent assessments, and the laws step in to fill legal gaps in the declaration or to place limits on the association’s discretion to levy fines and late fees.

In this case, the plaintiff homeowners alleged that the condominium association permitted its management company to assess fees that exceeded the statutory limits.It should be mentioned that this is an older condominium association, meaning that an amalgam of laws control the fees and charges.  The plaintiffs also asked the court to allow the case to proceed as a class-action lawsuit against the management company and the association.  The class-action status was rightfully rejected by the lower court in our opinion.  The plaintiffs appealed the court’s denial of class-action status, and this decision upheld the denial.  This was not a final decision on the merits of the case, so the case goes on, albeit without class-action status.

From a purely legal perspective, this case did not say a lot that was new.  However, we believe that this case is important to remind associations and their management companies to periodically take stock of the fees and fines that are assessed against homeowners to determine that all charges are compliant with the governing documents and within the bounds set by the law.  The fees and fines should be set forth either in the association’s governing documents or by a properly approved resolution or policy.  The maximum amount of late fees that can be assessed, for any particular month, is $20.00 or 10% of the amount overdue, and this amount can be charged only once per month.  The laws do allow the association to assess attorneys’ fees in many circumstances, although the association must provide the homeowner with proper notice beforehand.  These are only a few examples of charges that should be considered, so be sure to check with your management company or attorney to confirm that your HOA's charges are authorized by law.

Please give me a call or drop me an email if our HOA law team can assist your HOA or management company with the compliance process, or if we can be of assistance in any other way. We appreciate your reading our HOA law blog and encourage you to share it with others who may be interested. Thank you!

Supreme Court Loosens Up Construction Warranty Claims

The North Carolina Supreme Court does not often render decisions that directly affect HOAs, but on December 19, 2014, the Court issued an opinion in Christie v. Hartley Construction that may impact your HOA, and will certainly impact many consumers and construction contractors.

In 2004, the Christies, the plaintiffs in the case, were building their dream home and the builder suggested they purchase a stucco-like material called “SuperFlex” for the exterior. If properly maintained, the SuperFlex was promised to last decades, even in heavy sun, rain, salty air, and freezing conditions. The SuperFlex manufacturer even provided a lengthy written 20-year warranty for its product.

In spite of the promised durability of SuperFlex, a mere seven years later the SuperFlex began to flex, and then to crack and blister, causing moisture to penetrate the home. But no worries, the very specific 20-year warranty would protect the Christies, right? They sued in 2011 to enforce the warranty.

Not so, said the trial court. You see, North Carolina has a longstanding “statute of repose” for improvements to real estate (which includes most types of construction work on real estate). A statute of repose is like an outside statute of limitations. Whereas when a statute of limitations begins to run can depend on when the problem is discovered, a statute of repose says that a lawsuit cannot in any circumstances be filed later than a particular time period. In this case, the statute of repose for construction defects is and always has been six years.  (The ambitious or bored among you can can read it here - look at subsection (a)(5)(a).) This six-year statute of repose is intended to prevent builders and contractors from facing the possibility of an open-ended period of potential lawsuits.

No matter what, the trial court said, the statute of repose prevents a homeowner from suing to recover damages for improvements installed more than six years ago.  The 20-year warranty was worthless after six years.  On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals agreed.  According to the court, this was obviously an improvement to real property and the statute of repose is clearly six years, so the homeowners had to abide by the statute of repose and the warranty was unenforceable, even though the written warranty was very clearly for 20 years. This had been the rule for many years and was not a difficult call for the court.

But the N.C. Supreme Court thankfully reversed the lower courts.  The Supreme Court held that a very important general rule of law is that parties can freely contract, and if the SuperFlex manufacturer wanted to provide a warranty beyond the statute of repose’s 6-year period, then it was free to do so. 

If a seller of improvements to real estate has such confidence in its product that it provides a lengthy written warranty, there is no reason for it later to be able to shield itself behind the statute of repose.  In unusually harsh language, the Court stated that allowing a seller to disavow its warranty would result in “a sham, useful only to beguile the unsuspecting”.  Accordingly, the 20-year warranty stands and a number of years of legal precedent were overruled, and rightly so in our view.

Although this decision may not impact too many HOAs or condominiums since most construction lives up to its promises, there could be situations where it comes into play.  We do sometimes see situations where an HOA purchases an improvement to its real estate, (e.g. to improve its clubhouse), only to find out down the road that the construction fails.  Imagine how miffed the board and the members are when they find out that the ironclad warranty they purchased along with the construction is as worthless as the shoddy construction.  Now these HOAs may have a remedy where before they had none. 

Please give me a call or drop me an email if our HOA law team can assist your HOA or management company with the compliance process, or if we can be of assistance in any other way. We appreciate your reading our HOA law blog and encourage you to share it with others who may be interested. Thank you!

About the New Required Notice of Voluntary Prelitigation Mediation for HOA and Condominium Disputes

About the New Required Notice of Voluntary Prelitigation Mediation for HOA and Condominium Disputes

All HOAs and condominium associations in North Carolina now have the legal duty to inform all members at least yearly that they have the right to request voluntary mediation of any dispute with the association, except for disputes regarding payment of dues or assessments. Either party can decline to engage in mediation. This requirement took effect on July 1, 2013 pursuant to new statute 7A-38.3F, passed as Session Law 2013-127. You can read the text of the law here: SL 2013-127.

I have opined in a prior post on my blog that this new law was silly and unnecessary because it is completely voluntary, and I stick by that opinion. Anyone can agree to voluntary mediation or arbitration of any legal dispute already, so this law did not add anything new. My law practice certainly encourages these voluntary "alternative dispute resolution", or ADR, processes, and they can be very helpful in resolving legitimate disputes, especially business disputes. Remember, the law specifically states that either party can decline to participate in mediation for any reason, so the law has exactly zero teeth to it.

Anyway, your association now needs to notify its members of this new opportunity to request mediation of any legal dispute, other than a dispute involving the payment of dues. How should it do so? The law states that the notice must be posted on your HOA website, if you have one. If your HOA does not have a website - and it should, this is 2013 after all - the notice must be provided "at the same time and in the same manner as the names and addresses of all officers and board members of the association are published", which is already required by the Planned Community Act and the Condominium Act. (Your HOA is already doing this, right? It should be.) So this usually means within the annual meeting notice for HOAs which do not have a website. The main point is that the notice must be published in writing at least once per year.

So how should the notice be worded? Here is my recommended wording, which you are welcome to use verbatim: "Pursuant to N.C.G.S. Section 7A-38.3F, the association is required to notify its members yearly that members and the association may request voluntary mediation of any dispute with the association arising under the North Carolina [Planned Community Act][Condominium Act] (use whichever is appropriate for your association), or under the association's declaration, bylaws, or rules and regulations, other than a dispute relating solely to the failure to pay dues or assessments. Either party can decline to engage in mediation for any reason. The procedure for requesting mediation is set forth in the statute."

Please give me a call or drop me an email if our HOA law team can assist your HOA or management company in understanding or implementing this new requirement, or if we can be of assistance in any other way. We appreciate your reading our HOA law blog and encourage you to share it with others who may be interested. Thank you!

What if Fred and Barney lived in your HOA?

And what if Fred and Barney were goats? Fortunately for us, the Court of Appeals had occasion to address this burning issue recently in Steiner v. Windrow Estates HOA.

                                                                                                    

Mr. and Mrs. Steiner lived in Windrow Estates in southeast Mecklenburg County, and had as their beloved pets two “certified Nigerian Dwarf” goats named Fred and Barney. Of course, the CCRs prohibited “livestock”, as most do, although interestingly, they did allow horses as Windrow Estates is an equestrian community. The case turned on whether Fred and Barney were livestock, as the HOA contended, or household pets as the Steiners argued. The trial court had found in favor of the Steiners on summary judgment.

The drafter of these particular CCRs failed to define the word “livestock”. When that happens, courts typically look to determine the “ordinary meaning” of the word in question, which means they usually simply look it up in the dictionary. Here, the Court referred to Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary and determined that “livestock” are “farm animals kept for use or profit” whereas pets are “domesticated animal[s] kept for pleasure rather than utility.”

The Court set forth excerpts from Mrs. Steiner’s affidavit in lengthy and sympathetic detail. Mrs. Steiner had been diagnosed with health problems and her physician recommended pets to speed her recovery. After some research, she determined that Nigerian Dwarf goats made excellent pets and could also live comfortably with the horses that the Steiners already kept on their property. The goats were bought from an outfit (Peach Tree Farms in nearby Oakboro) that sells them solely as pets, she said, and they were neutered and don’t produce milk or meat, so they could not be used for profit. Mrs. Steiner also testified that the goats were “affectionate, gentle, and make great companions.” (Apparently these particular goats don’t eat everything they see like the garden-variety goats I am familiar with – especially the one that once ate my uncle’s dentures. But that is another story.)

Dwarf Nigerian Goat from Peach Tree Farms' website.

Mrs. Steiner also testified that the goats lived outside in the stable with the horses, which to me seems more suggestive of livestock than household pets, but the Court somewhat facilely glossed over this issue by stating that household pets don’t necessarily have to live inside the house to be considered pets.

As often is the case when a court chooses to quote liberally from the one side’s testimony in its opinion, the Court of Appeals decided in favor of the sympathetic plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. Steiner, holding that Fred and Barney were indeed pets and upholding the decision of the Superior Court. But the bigger question is, why did the Court decide the way it did and what, if anything, can we learn from this opinion? I see at least three takeaways for HOAs:

The first and most obvious takeaway is that it is critically important to define terms in CCRs. Obviously, had the CCRs clearly stated that goats were included in the term “livestock”, it would have helped the HOA’s case, but most likely this wouldn’t have changed the outcome, because it appears that the goats in this case were in fact pets.

Second, the plaintiffs in this case came across very sympathetically, and since judges are people too, this was an important part of why the decision ended up the way it did. HOAs facing litigation should very carefully consider the relative sympathies of the parties involved before incurring the expense of protracted litigation, even if they feel the legalities are on their side. Don’t miss the forest for the trees when deciding whether litigation is warranted.

Finally, it is crucially important for HOAs to be aware that North Carolina courts look upon all CCRs with a jaundiced eye. The Court of Appeals spent a good portion of its opinion harping on this particular doctrine, summarizing it as follows:

“The law looks with disfavor upon covenants restricting the free use of property. As a consequence, the law declares that nothing can be read into a restrictive covenant enlarging its meaning beyond what its language plainly and unmistakably imports.”

This gave the Court the legal support it was looking for to read the term “livestock” very restrictively (even though the careful reader will note that the Merriam-Webster definition states that livestock includes “farm animals”, and I can’t imagine anyone arguing that goats are not generally considered farm animals) and to find in favor of plaintiffs it clearly found to be worthy of its support, even on summary judgment. In addition, and perhaps I am just being paranoid here, this allowed the Court to hand the HOA community another in a fairly consistent string of losses at the North Carolina appellate level on facts that seemingly could have gone either way.

The case is Steiner v. Windrow Estates Home Owners Association, Inc., 713 S.E.2d 518 (July 19, 2011). Read the full text of the opinion here: http://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&pdf=MjAxMS8xMC04NjUtMS5wZGY=